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of the right to waive the jury trial generally.28 New York, although
denying the right, has also regarded the problem as being much the
same in both cases.27
The actual operation of the waiver has been left to the legislature. At the present writing no legislation has been proposed .or enacted. It must be decided whether it shall extend to both felony and
misdemeanor cases or confined to the latter. There is no good reason
why it should not be applied to both, although other states in some
instances have refused to do so. Limiting the amendment to crimes
not punishable by death is, on the other hand, reasonable, for the
forfeiture of a human life is a serious thing and would tend to place
too great a strain on the trial judge.
The correct mode of waiver will have to be determined. It may
take the form of a writing, or a statement in open court entered in the
record, or both.
On the whole the amendment is a step forward in loosening the
fetters on our criminal procedure, and a practical effort to lessen the
congestion in the courts.
Whether or not accused persons will take advantage of the new
procedure remains to be seen, but if statistics 28 available in other
states are any criterion, the answer seems to be that they will do so,
especially in certain types of crimes.
JOHN L. CONNERS.

RECENT PENAL LAW PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO PUNISHMENT
FOR FELONY MURDER.-By the enactment of Chapter 67 of the Laws

of 1937,1 the legislature took the first important step in the history
of the state of New York to ameliorate the punishment for murder in
the first degree. 2 The statute was passed by the legislature in the
form of an amendment to Section 1045 of the Penal Law, and by the
addition thereto of a new section, 1045-a. 3
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 Sup. Ct. 253 (1930).
- Cancemi v. People,, 18 N. Y. 128 (1858).
= Recent reports show that in Connecticut 70% of the cases were tried by
the court; in Maryland, 87.7%; in Michigan, 55.6%; in Ohio, 17.8%; Rhode
Island, 11.4%. In California figures from the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County as of 1934 show 65% of the defendants waived their right to be tried
by a jury. This resulted in an estimated saving of $60,000 a year. JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, Second Report (1936).
'SEN. Doc. No. 28 passed March 17. 1937.
2The Duke of York's Laws, 1665-75 (1 Colonial Laws of New York 20)
§ 2, was the first statute to provide for capital punishment in New York. The
provisions of this act were incorporated in the Revised Statutes and have continued to the present day. REv. STAT., pt. 4, c. 1, tit. 1, p. 655.
'N. Y. Consol. Laws, c. 39.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

Section 1 of the Act provides that Section 1045 of the Penal
Law, "is hereby amended to read as follows:
"§ 1045. Punishment for murder in the first degree.
Murder in the first degree is punishable by death, unless the
jury recommends life imprisonment as provided by § 1045-a."
This provision obviously was merely a necessary addition in view of
the succeeding section, which reads as enacted:
"§ 1045-a. Life imprisonment for felony murder; jury
may recommend. A jury finding a person guilty of murder
in the first degree, as defined by subdivision two of section ten
hundred and forty-four, may, as part of its verdict, recommend
that the defendant be imprisoned for the term of his natural
life. Upon such recommendation, the court may sentence the
defendant to imprisonment for the term of his natural life."
In connection with the enactment of this statute some interesting
questions are presented. In the first place it would seem that the new
amendment will eradicate, to some extent at least, a difficulty that has
long existed in the application of our felony murder doctrine.
Prior to the enactment of Section 1045-a, if X and Y joined in
the commission of a robbery on A, and in the course of fulfilling the
crime, X killed A, then upon the trial for murder, X, the actual slayer,
would be entitled to a charge to the jury on the lower degrees of
homicide, 4 while Y, the accomplice, would not, in most instances, have
the advantage of such a charge. 5 Although this is warranted, because
obviously the accomplice could not be guilty of the lower degrees, it
results in the anomaly of making compromise verdicts more frequent
for the slayer than for the accomplice. This situation has frequently
been discussed and criticized by the Court of Appeals, 6 and their views
'Peo. v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 454, 132 N. E. 147 (1921); Peo. v.
Smith, 232 N. Y. 239, 133 N. E. 574 (1921) ; Peo. v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147,
155 N. E. 79 (1926); Peo. v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927). But
see Peo. v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 90 N. E. 950 (1910).
' Communication of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature
Relating to Homicide (LEGIs. Doc. No. 65(P), 1937) pt. IV(C), p. 169, et seq.;
Peo. v. Seiler, 246 N. Y. 262, 158 N. E. 246 (1927). But cf. Peo. v. Cummings and Lewis, 274 N. Y. 336, 8 N. E. (2d) 882 (1937), in which Chief Judge
Crane cautions the trial courts that the lesser degrees of homicide may be
omitted from the charge only where the case has been tried solely on the theory
of felony murder, with no evidence of premeditation having been offered.
'In Peo. v. Seiler, 246 N. Y. 262, 268, 158 N. E. 615, 617 (1927), the
court said: "It is said that the result is that the law treats with greater harshness
the accessory to the murder than the murderer himself. Doubtless there are
cases where a jury, instructed that it has the power to find the defendant guilty
of a lesser degree of homicide than charged, will exercise that power, although
it would bring in a verdict of guilty as charged if no other alternative were
presented. On the other hand, a jury may at times bring in a verdict of not
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have undoubtedly been instrumental in effecting the enactmentof the
legislation under consideration. 7 What effect, then, would the new
statute have upon the case above mentioned? If the jury found X
guilty of murder in the first degree, or felony murder, they probably
would not hesitate to mete out similar punishment to his accomplice.
However, if the jury found X guilty of a lower degree of homicide,
they would not be forced to choose between condemnation and freedom for Y. The new section would remove the dilemma by permitting
the jury to convict and recommend life imprisonment.8
The next interesting point in this statute is the discretionary
power given to the jury and the court as regards its application. The
jury "* * * may recommend;" and "* * * the court may sentence ** *" The use of "may" in the statute seems to bring out more
forcibly the fact that the enactment was designed to assist the court
and jury in cases involving felony murder with an accomplice.
From the text of the section it is obvious that the court is powerless to act without the recommendation of the jury. If the jury makes
such recommendation, it is mandatory upon the court to sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment. 9 This interpretation is in conformity
with the rule of construction that where the statute invests a public
body with a power or authority which concerns the public interests or
the rights of individuals its permissive form will be construed as
mandatory. 10
The next important point of the statute to be noted is an apparent
discrepancy contained therein. The preamble of the law, as enacted,
is, "An act to amend the Penal Law in relation to punishment for
guilty though it is convinced of guilt if it quails before the responsibility of
bringing in a verdict which carries with it the penalty of death. Where the
evidence proves the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, and the jury
believes that evidence, the defendant may be helped or harmed by a charge that
the jury has power to convict of a lesser degree of homicide, according to the
steadfastness and conscientiousness of the particular jury sitting in that case.
If sometimes as a result the guilty escape, or juries mete out unequal justice, it
lies with the legislature to determine whether these considerations should dictate
some change in the law. Certainly if the defendant is not guilty of the crime
charged, he may not be convicted of a lesser degree of crime he did not commit."
' See also Governor Lehman's message to the legislature, Jan. 6, 1937,
wherein he called attention to the need for such legislation.
'Peo. v. Smith, 163 Misc. 469, 297 N. Y. Supp. 489-(1937).
SPeo. v. De Renna, N. Y. L. J.,-March 5, 1938, p. 1, col. 4, citing Chicago

v. McClaughry, 148 Il. 372, 36 N. E. 88 (1894) ; Peo. v. Smith, 253 Ill. 283,
97 N. E. 649 (1912); State v. Barry, 14 N. D. 316, 103 N. W. 637 (1905);
Buck v. Danzanbacker, 37 N. J. L. 359 (1875) ; Ex parte Doyle, 62 W. Va. 280,
57 S. E. 824 (1907). In Pennsylvania the jury is required by statute to fix the
penalty of death or imprisonment for life at its discretion, on conviction for
murder in the first degree. P. L. 759 (1925), Pa. St. Supp. (1928) § 7975;
Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 904 (1928). Contra: Peo. v.
Smith, 163 Misc. 469, 297 N. Y. Supp. 489 (1937).
" BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS (Hornbook Series,

1896) c. 12, p. 341; Peo. v. De Renna, N. Y. L. J., March 5, 1938, p. 1, col. 4;
State v. Barry, 14 N. D. 316, 103 N. W. 637 (1905); Ex parte Doyle, 62 W.
Va. 280, 57 S-E. 824 (1907).
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murder committed by a person engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a felony." 11 (Italics ours.) This heading
clearly shows the intended scope of the enactment. It was apparently
meant to apply only in felony murder cases. This limitation is further
borne out by the title of Penal Law, Section 1045-a, which reads, "Life
imprisonment for felony murder; jury may recommend." (Italics
ours.) These captions indicate an apparent conflict with the body of
the new section which provides for the recommendation of life imprisonment by a jury finding a person guilty of murder in the first
degree "as defined by subd. 2 of Section 1044."
It will be seen from a cursory reading of subdivision 2 of Section 1044 that that subdivision is not concerned solely with felony
murder.12 The question arises then, whether the legislature intended
Section 1045-a to include within its scope the first clause of subdivision 2 of Section 1044, which provides that the killing of a human
being "by an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without the premeditated design to effect the death of any individual," is murder in the
first degree. It would seem that the new statute goes beyond the
legislative intent in this regard.
The law with regard to murder "by an act imminently dangerous, etc." has been the subject of varied interpretation and conflicting
opinion throughout the history of criminal jurisprudence.' 3 Save for
a two-year interval, this provision has continued almost without4
change in the law of this state from the time of the Revised Statutes.'
The chief difficulty with the provision seems to have been in deciding
what acts are "imminently dangerous to others." This difficulty has
been to a great extent removed by a long series of well decided cases.15
Hence it will be seen that the reasons for an amendment to the Penal
Laws of 1937, c. 67.
LAW (Consol. Laws, c. 39) § 1044; "The killing of a human
being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the first degree when
committed: * * *
"2. By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved
mind, regardless of human life, although without a premeditated design to effect
the death of any individual; or, without a design to effect deathi, by a person
engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a felony, either upon
the person killed or otherwise."
134 BL. CoMM. (1897) *200; FosTER, CROWN LAW (3d ed., 1809) 263;
1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1st Am. ed., 1847) 475. In 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN (8th ed., 1824), cases cited in § 4, at p. 85, and § 9, at p. 86, are
directly in conflict with those cited in § 68, at p. 104.
" REv. STAT. § 5 (Laws of 1829). The Laws of 1860, c. 410 eliminated the
"depraved mind" rule, but it was re-enacted by c. 197, Laws of 1862.
Peo. v. Fuller, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 16 (N. Y. 1823); Peo. v. Rector, 19
Wend. 569 (N. Y. 1838); Peo. v. White, 22 Wend. 167 (N. Y. 1839);
Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120 (1854) ; Yates v. People, 32 N. Y. 509 (1865) ;
Peo. v. Gallo, 149 N. Y. 106, 43 N. E. 529 (1896); Peo. v. Jernatowski, 238
N. Y. 188, 144 N. E. 497 (1924) ; Peo. v. Voelker, 220 App. Div. 528, 221 N.
Y. Supp. 760 (4th Dept. 1927).
'PENAL

1938]

CURRENT LEGISLATION

Law that exist with respect to felony murder do not apply to this
other type of homicide.
How the courts will construe the statute is problematical.' 0 They
will, however, be guided by the rules of construction laid down by the
Consolidated Laws,17 and the cases. 18 The statute provides that the
title, strictly speaking, is not part of the act.' 9 Indeed, except in the
enactment of private and local laws, a title is unnecessary.20 The
courts may resort to the title as an aid to interpretation only when the
legislative intent is not clearly expressed in the enactment. The substance of a plain act cannot be restricted or extended by the language
of the title. 21 Applying these principles to Section 1045-a, it may be
pointed out that the language of the section is clear and unambiguous.
It seems, therefore, that the courts will be constrained to apply the
statute to cases arising under either of the clauses in subdivision 2 of
Section 1044.
Since the hands of the courts are apparently tied, the cure for
the defect that has been pointed out seems to lie in legislative action.
An amendment to the Penal Law, providing for a division of subdivision 2 of Section 1044 into two subdivisions, numbered 2 and 2-a, with
the former containing the felony murder clause only, would serve to
fulfill the intent of the legislature in enacting Section 1045-a as it is
now written.
EDwARD

F. AsiP.

"In Peo. v. Smith, 163 Misc. 469, 297 N. Y. Supp. 489 (1937), Justice
Harris, writing 'the first opinion officially reported in a case involving this
statute, points out the intent of the legislature, and the reason for its enactment.
IN. Y. Consol. Laws, c. 1 and c. 21.
"8Furman v. New York, 5 Sandf. 16, aff'd, 10 N. Y. 567 (1853) ; Peo. v.
Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319 (1887).
20N. Y. Consol. Laws, c. 1, § 94; Peo. v. Molyneux, 40 N. Y. 113 (1869);
Neumann v. New York, 137 App. Div. 55, 122 N. Y. Supp. 62 (2d Dept. 1910).
IN. Y. Consol. Laws, c. 1, §§ 38, 39.
"Peo. v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58 (1857); Peo. v. Columbia Co., 43 N. Y.
130 (1870); Peo. v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 18 N. E. 692 (1888); Peo. v. Van
Wyck, 157 N. Y. 495, 52 N. E. 559 (1899).

